
Starting around 12:45 UTC on November 10, an attacker used stolen credentials for 4,837 GitHub accounts to plant a credential stealer in repositories those accounts could write to, according to application-security company Aikido, which tracks the campaign as “wfx-loot.” The stealer is built to grab the secrets and cloud credentials that a repository’s automated build (CI) workflows can reach. Aikido found signs it ran in at least 1,806 repositories; BleepingComputer, summarizing the same research, gave “at least 1,835 targets.” The Hacker News notes that Aikido’s analysis does not explain how the attacker obtained the account credentials.
Each attack began with a test pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes,” opened from a branch named wfx-docs to check whether the account had write access. Aikido counts 61,839 such pull requests between November 10 at 12:45 UTC and November 11 at 15:00 UTC, and The Hacker News puts the number of repositories probed at 61,764. A real payload commit then followed in some of them, in one of three forms: roughly 1,500 lines added to an existing workflow, a new workflow file on a short-lived branch, or an npm install hook. The attacker usually reverted the change within minutes and deleted the workflow run and its logs, so a missing run number in a repository’s workflow history is often the only trace. Separately, researchers at SafeDep counted more than 8,000 public repositories that received malicious commits between Tuesday and early Thursday, which includes repositories where the stealer never ran.
The script collects GitHub Actions secrets and variables, the workflow’s GITHUB_TOKEN, cloud credentials for AWS, Azure and Google Cloud, and developer credentials for tools such as Git, SSH, npm, PyPI, Docker, Kubernetes, Vault and Terraform. Aikido and BleepingComputer also list AI-service keys among its targets. It can exchange GitHub OIDC tokens for temporary cloud sessions, and on AWS it can create long-lived access keys. BleepingComputer reports that some of the compromised accounts belonged to Fortune 100 organizations, the US General Services Administration, the French government, Nextcloud and WebdriverIO, and that about 50 appear to have publishing rights on package ecosystems such as npm, PyPI, Go, crates and Packagist.
The campaign also reached two published packages through automated publishing: the Packagist package digitalelvis/neuronai-studio version 3.14.3, and the Go module github.com/onuragtas/docker-env versions v1.0.278 and v1.0.280. For the Go module, Aikido says the payload sits only in a workflow file, the Go source and release binaries are unchanged, and Go builds never run workflow files, so consumers may not have been affected. Aikido notes overlap with the 2025 GhostAction campaign; for earlier GitHub-token abuse we have covered, see GhostAction and Gheist.
How to check if you’re affected
Affected products are any GitHub repository you can write to, plus the accounts with write access to them, and any machine that installed the two affected package versions above. Check from November 10 onward for these signs (Aikido and The Hacker News):
- A branch named
wfx-docs, a branch matchingchore/followed by eight characters, or one matchingci-check-followed by four digits. - A pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes.”
- Commits titled “ci: refresh build cache,” “chore: add ci helper,” “chore: add dependency audit workflow,” “ci: restore” or “ci: cleanup.”
- Gaps in your workflow run numbers around those commits, which The Hacker News calls the more reliable sign that the stealer ran.
- Network indicators in Aikido’s report:
194.150.166[.]244:8080and18.143.168[.]96:8080(path/exfil). SafeDep notes the second is a cloud-hosted address that may be reassigned, and The Hacker News adds153.75.82[.]159:8080and a Telegram channel as exfiltration routes. The stealer script’s SHA-256 is89695abb392d5cfd4972672961e644bb46baa98aa1ed7173c2a2816c762735cf.
Any account that opened one of the test pull requests should be treated as compromised, even if no payload followed (Aikido). If the payload ran, Aikido says to assume every secret and cloud role available to those workflows is compromised. SafeDep’s guidance for repositories on its list:
- Revoke the commit author’s tokens, OAuth app grants, SSH keys and sessions, and turn on 2FA.
- Rotate every secret and variable the repository can read, including environment and organization secrets, and any key the runner could reach.
- Delete the
wfx-docsbranch and close the probe pull request. - Pull any package version built between the malicious commit and the cleanup commit, and republish from a clean commit.
- If someone ran
npm installon an affected commit, treat that machine as compromised and rotate its keys.
SafeDep also lists cloud-side backdoor checks: Entra ID federated credentials named wfx-ci-* that you did not create; AWS CloudTrail AssumeRole or AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity events with session names starting wfx-, followed by CreateAccessKey or UpdateAssumeRolePolicy; and GCP GenerateAccessToken and SignJwt calls from your GitHub workload identity pool.
The Hacker News found more test pull requests with the same title early on Thursday, between 05:04 and 05:38 UTC, after Aikido’s own search had ended, so the activity appears to be continuing. It was not clear whether the stealer followed in those.
Sources
- Aikido: wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories
- SafeDep: wfx: GitHub Actions Credential Stealer Hits 8,000 Repos
- The Hacker News: Attacker Used 4,837 Hijacked GitHub Accounts to Run a CI Secret Stealer in 1,806+ Repositories
- BleepingComputer: Hackers compromise 4,800 GitHub accounts to steal cloud credentials
