
ConnectWise said on November 16 (20:00 UTC) that it has completed its investigation into the ScreenConnect attacks on managed service providers (MSPs), but that the work for customers is not over. Researchers keep reporting activity against on-premises environments where the third-party extensions it identified are still enabled or ScreenConnect has not been updated, and ConnectWise says completing the investigation does not show that any individual environment is clean. We covered the first wave on November 12; this is what has changed since.
On November 13 at 16:12 UTC, Huntress saw another spike in SCKit-related detections, from new infrastructure: 205 more hosts across 41 organizations, on top of the 288 endpoints at 48 organizations from the first wave. The pattern was the same: rogue ScreenConnect clients installed through a victim’s panel, a check for sckit-decoder.ps1, though Huntress saw no follow-on execution of it in this wave and The Hacker News notes there is no evidence the worm-like spread to technician workstations has succeeded in the latest campaign. In one case the organization ran a self-hosted copy of the RMM+ extension, which Huntress ties to the activity through a flaw in versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 that accepted a blank access key when an administrator had never set one. Huntress also noticed an installer parameter (c=Exploited###) whose number kept rising across the campaign, up to Exploited809 on one panel that compromised 190 downstream clients; Huntress reads that as the attacker counting compromised hosts. ConnectWise’s updated advisory (November 13, 21:15 UTC) adds three more extensions it disabled in cloud environments and its marketplace as a precaution: ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter. It cannot do this for on-premises installs.
How to check if you’re affected
Affected products are ScreenConnect deployments, cloud-hosted or on-premises, that use any of the extensions ConnectWise names, and any technician workstation running a ScreenConnect client older than version 26.6.5. Per ConnectWise’s advisory:
- On-premises partners: disable Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link now, and update ScreenConnect to the latest supported version. ConnectWise also strongly encourages all partners to disable ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter until further notice. Do not re-enable or reinstall any of them pending further guidance, and if you previously disabled them, verify they stay disabled on every instance.
- All partners: verify that every technician client runs ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later, the build released September 8 with the fix for CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9, a client flaw that could allow files to be transferred and executed through an active session without Host confirmation; ConnectWise’s bulletin says servers are not affected). ConnectWise says updating the server or cloud console alone does not confirm the clients are updated, and that version 26.6.5 and later blocks the toolkit’s attempted endpoint-to-technician spread.
- Review Run Command history, extension API activity, administrative accounts, permission changes and Toolbox records for commands you did not start; revoke active ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions from a trusted device, reset credentials and enforce MFA (ConnectWise notes password resets alone do not end existing sessions).
- Do not use ScreenConnect to investigate or clean a suspect endpoint; use EDR or another out-of-band tool, and remove persistence before restoring connectivity. ConnectWise says disabling extensions and updating do not remove access already established.
Huntress’s second-wave indicators include the rogue client host 185.241.211[.]197 (which Huntress ties to 1337 Services GmbH, a hosting provider it says has hosted malicious traffic before), the guest-session host 007[.]from-ak[.]com, an installer named UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi, a netsh port-proxy rule from 127.0.0.1:88 to 185.241.211[.]197:80 with edits to the hosts file, and in one incident a service called “Windows Update Agent” running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe from C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\ under the LocalSystem account. If a provider manages your devices with ScreenConnect and you are not an MSP yourself, our suggestion, not the vendors’, is to ask them whether they used any of these extensions and have completed these steps.
Related earlier coverage: ScreenConnect Attacks Hit MSPs; ConnectWise Disables 5 Extensions.
Sources
- ConnectWise Trust Center: ScreenConnect security advisory (updates of November 13 and 16)
- ConnectWise: 2026-09-08 ScreenConnect security bulletin (CVE-2026-84869)
- Huntress: SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints (with November 13 update)
- The Hacker News: ConnectWise Warns ScreenConnect Attacks Continue as SCKit Targets Unpatched Systems
