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vCenter CVE-2026-123890 Exploited as Zero-Day Since September

· 3 min read · Got hacked Network safety
vCenter CVE-2026-123890 Exploited as Zero-Day Since September

On the day Broadcom patched the VMware vCenter authentication bypass CVE-2026-123890, Google’s Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group published a report saying the flaw had already been used as a zero-day. Mandiant says a suspected China-linked group it tracks as ARMORY CASTLE (formerly UNC5221) exploited it in early September 2026, according to forensic evidence. BleepingComputer notes that Broadcom itself has not confirmed exploitation; our earlier post on the patch relayed that Broadcom reported no attacks.

Mandiant describes the flaw as an unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key disclosure over DCE/RPC in the vCenter Directory Service. Exploiting it creates an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local, which the attacker can use to run commands and pull files such as the directory database (data.mdb). In the intrusion Mandiant describes, the attackers first compromised a BeyondTrust Remote Support appliance (CVE-2026-102764, covered in BeyondTrust Patches Remote Support Zero-Day Used Since August), moved to an internal Linux appliance, scanned for VMware ports, and then ran a custom Go tool, BONESAW, against vCenter. Mandiant says BONESAW exfiltrates the directory database, hijacks the SAML token service and creates a Single Sign-On administrator account. A second tool, SAWSNAKE, then forges SAML tokens (a “Golden SAML” attack), which BleepingComputer says can bypass multifactor authentication.

After that, Mandiant says the attackers switched on SSH on the vCenter appliance through its management API, took the appliance’s master encryption key and database password, switched SSH off again, and moved on to ESXi hosts. From the ESXi file system they extracted files from guest virtual machines, including Windows Active Directory database files, archived them and copied the archive to a Linux appliance; Mandiant says the data was likely exfiltrated from there. Mandiant says the BONESAW build date is more than a month older than its use in this intrusion, which it takes to mean the tool was likely developed for broader operations.

How to check if you’re affected

Affected products are VMware vCenter Server, SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows running any version earlier than the fixed versions in Broadcom’s VMSA-2026-0009, as quoted by BleepingComputer. Broadcom lists no workaround; BleepingComputer says network restrictions and firewall controls can reduce exposure. Our earlier post lists the fixed vCenter builds from Broadcom’s FAQ (8.0 U3m and 9.0.2.0200); take the 9.1 build from the advisory itself. Our suggestion, not Broadcom’s: patch first, then look for signs of earlier compromise, because an update does not by itself remove an attacker who is already in.

Indicators from Mandiant’s report to search for on vCenter and on Linux appliances in the same network:

  • Files: ActiveSer.jsp (SLIMSAVAGE webshell) and u.jsp (CAGEMATCH staging webshell); /tmp/123 (BONESAW), /tmp/sss (SAWSNAKE), /tmp/dbr (BEARBONES backdoor) and /usr/bin/vmtoolscs (LAZYBONES backdoor, which talks to its operator over Slack).
  • vCenter activity: an unexpected local administrator in the SSO domain (Mandiant saw one named sps- followed by a redacted string, at @vsphere.local), and SSH being enabled and then disabled again through the appliance API (PUT /rest/appliance/access/ssh).
  • ESXi activity: a new public key in the root account’s authorized_keys, WinSCP connections, and a hidden .a directory on a VMFS volume.
  • Network: Mandiant lists 11 IP addresses as a suspected obfuscation network: 103.147.251.5, 103.190.38.3, 118.174.128.34, 118.174.128.36, 118.174.128.38, 176.9.89.66, 185.71.15.109, 220.121.128.41, 222.108.77.44, 61.216.56.127 and 81.45.89.43. Its internal scans included ports 443, 2012, 5480 and 9080.
  • If vCenter was exposed: Mandiant says the attackers took the vCenter master key and database password, and BleepingComputer says BONESAW can extract SAML signing keys. The report does not give steps for rotating them; treat that as a question for Broadcom or your incident responder (our suggestion) rather than assuming a patch alone is enough.

For hardening, Mandiant recommends treating the vCenter appliance’s default web-managed firewall as insufficient and points to a VCSA Hardening and Logging Tool, an iptables-based default-deny policy with egress filtering and remote logging. Mandiant advises rigorous testing and formal change control before using it in production.

Sources

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